Nearly two years after a Federal High Court in Abuja ordered the Federal Government to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of all attacks against journalists and other media practitioners, and take measures to prevent further attacks, the Attorney-General of the Federation is asking the Court of Appeal in Abuja to allow the Government to appeal the judgment by granting an extension of time since the three months prescribed by Law for lodging appeals has lapsed.

In a motion on notice filed on December 23, 2025, by Mr. A.B. Mohammed, a counsel in the Federal Ministry of Justice, on behalf of the Attorney-General, the Government is seeking an order of the Court of Appeal extending time for it to appeal the judgment of the Federal High Court delivered by Justice Inyang Ekwo on February 16, 2024.

Section 24(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004 (as amended), stipulates that the period for the giving of notice of appeal or notice of application for leave to appeal in a civil matter is three months where the appeal is against a final decision of the court.

Justice Ekwo’s judgment arose from a suit filed on behalf of Media Rights Agenda (MRA) by human rights lawyer, Mrs. Mojirayo Ogunlana-Nkanga, on October 26, 2021, in which the organization complained about the violation of the fundamental rights to life and freedom of expression of Nigerian journalists and media practitioners who were murdered at various times over the last few decades in the line of duty or under circumstances relating to the discharge of their duties as journalists and the failure of the Federal Government to protect them, carry out effective investigation, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of the murders.

MRA named some of the murdered journalists as the late Editor-in-Chief of Newswatch magazine, Mr. Dele Giwa, who was killed on October 19, 1986 by a parcel bomb in his home in Lagos; Ms Bolade Fasasi, a member of the National Association of Women Journalists and former treasurer of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), who was shot dead by three unidentified gunmen in Ibadan on March 31, 1998; Mr. Edward Olalekan Ayo-Ojo, who was found dead beside his car on a road in Lagos in the early hours of June 1, 1999; and Mr. Omololu Falobi, a former features editor of The Punch and founder of the media advocacy group, Journalists Against AIDS (JAIDS), who was gunned down in Lagos on October 5, 2006, on his way home from his office.

Other journalists identified by MRA are Mr. Godwin Agbroko, Chairman of the Editorial Board of This Day newspaper, who was murdered by unknown gunmen on December 22, 2006; Mr. Abayomi Ogundeji, a member of the Editorial Board of This Day newspaper, who was shot dead on August 17, 2008; and Mr. Edo Sule-Ugbagwu, Judicial Correspondent of The Nation newspaper, who was murdered in his home in Lagos by a gang of armed men on April 24, 2010.

In his February 2024 judgment, Justice Ekwo held that “journalism and media practice are constitutional professions in their respective rights” as it is the exercise of the rights provided for in Section 39(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution that gives foundation for journalism and media practice, and ruled that MRA had “established its case by credible evidence”.

The judge therefore issued eight declaratory reliefs sought by MRA and directed the Federal Government to take measures to prevent attacks on journalists and other media practitioners; investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of all attacks against journalists, and ensure that all victims of attacks against journalists have access to effective remedies.

He ordered the government to take measures to raise awareness and build the capacities of various stakeholders, including law enforcement, security, intelligence, military and other officials on the laws and standards for ensuring the safety of journalists and media practitioners.

Stating the grounds upon which the application was made, the Federal Government said in its motion paper that it is “desirous to appeal” the judgment, but it did not explain why it has not lodged any appeal for over 22 months, except to say that it needs time to appeal.

In an affidavit in support of the motion, Mr. Kelechi Ohaeri, a litigation officer in the Department of Civil Appeals at the Federal Ministry of Justice in Abuja, said the application is necessary in the interest of justice and in furtherance of the Government’s constitutional right to appeal.

He explained that the Government had prepared a proposed Notice of Appeal, which sets out the grounds of appeal, and claimed that the grounds of appeal contained in the proposed notice are recondite.

In his written address, Mr. Mohammed said “upon a consideration of the judgment” delivered by Justice Ekwo, the Government has discovered errors and therefore wishes to exercise its constitutional right of appeal as guaranteed by Section 243 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.

No date has been fixed for the hearing of the motion.

By Tosin Osasona

Nigeria’s post-1999 democratic era has coincided with one of the gravest crises of state authority in the country’s history, with the state appearing weak and incapable of defending its authority. Fundamentalist Islamist groups, ethnic militants, gangs, secessionist movements, cult groups, organized criminal groups, and political thugs, among others, have relentlessly challenged the state to a duel of superiority, forcing the state into either spasms of retroactive violence or face-saving settlements.

While this crisis of governance has interconnecting structural and operational drivers, political actors, particularly at the subnational level, have increasingly framed the decentralisation of the Nigeria Police Force as one of the key solutions to this complex problem.

Undoubtedly, the centrally controlled Nigeria Police Force and the uniform conceptualisation of policing in Nigeria are problematic for the country’s diversity and complexity.

In acknowledgement of this fact, every president since 1999 has initiated police reform of some sort. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration appears poised to advance the most far-reaching reform yet: the constitutional amendment required to permit state-controlled police services. While the political momentum behind this proposal is significant, the critical policy question remains unresolved-will the creation of state police meaningfully address Nigeria’s security crisis, or merely reproduce existing failures at a subnational scale?

There is no empirical, contextual, or policy-based evidence that suggests constitutional authorisation alone can deliver Nigeria’s much-needed security outcomes. Public policy effectiveness is largely determined by the political and institutional environment in which it operates.

For a political system characterised by low levels of accountability, deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions, permanently simmering secessionist agitations, and politicisation of policy processes, will the establishment of state police not create worse problems in the long term? What will stop these new policing outfits from being appropriated as personal enforcement gangs for state governors?

While policing is less about institutional form and more about institutional character, Nigeria is oddly one of the few countries globally among multiethnic and multireligious federal states that expressly prohibits subnational governments from exercising any policing authority.

Therefore, the case for state police is compelling; however, the challenges lie less in principle than in the operational and institutional details. Given Nigeria’s political history, how then should the proposed police decentralisation be structured to safeguard critical constitutional guarantees, enhance the capacity of subnational units to respond to local security concerns, and reduce the potential for abuse?

Across the world, all effective and efficient policing systems are built on three crosscutting pillars: legitimacy, accountability, and professional competence. Assessments based on multiple performance indicators suggest that the Nigeria Police Force performs poorly across all three dimensions.

Creating state police will at best address the question of legitimacy, leaving unresolved the crisis of accountability and professional competence. The Nigeria Police Force is the ideological successor entity to the colonial Consular Guard of 1861, which was built on the mantra of using ‘strangers to police strangers’—an extractive policing system conceived to protect ruling power rather than local communities. State-created policing outfits will at least be resourced from local communities, would be enmeshed in local contexts, and would have cultural affinity with the communities they serve.

This will to some extent address legitimacy concerns that bedevil the Police Force in Nigeria. Unless there is deliberate institutional design, state creation and control of policing authorities will not automatically translate to fairer and more respectful policing procedures, a more equitable distribution of policing outcomes, or strict adherence to law and human rights.

Policing is an expensive enterprise, demanding sustained investment in personnel, training, infrastructure, intelligence systems, and operational logistics.

Without these critical financial inputs, a decentralised system risks merely replicating the current inefficiencies at a subnational level. Currently, only nine out of the 36 states can meet their salary obligations without total dependence on federal funds, and only about 20 states are paying the current minimum wage.

Where, therefore, will the funds to finance the proposed state policing outfits come from? The stark disparity in fiscal capacity of states creates a dangerous possibility, where poorly funded state police units could become bands of armed men, nominally in uniform but functionally abandoned to fend for themselves.

This would incentivize extortion, predation on the very citizens they are meant to protect, and could see these units auctioning their coercive power to the highest bidder, deepening insecurity and corruption. Therefore, the transition to state police demands not just a constitutional amendment, but a fundamental revaluation of fiscal federalism to prevent the birth of thirty-six potentially uneven and, in some cases, dangerously unmoored police services.

Beyond the hurdle of fiscal viability lies the more contentious question of operational and organizational independence. If state police services are to be more than just ‘State House Enforcers’ with broader jurisdictions, their leadership must be insulated from local politics.

Lessons from abuses by the First Republic’s Regional policing force teach that without clear institutional safeguards, state police risk becoming instruments of political patronage rather than instruments of public safety.

Independence, among other things, will require legal frameworks that define the chain of accountability, establish professional standards, and create oversight mechanisms—possibly through independent policing commissions—ensuring that state police serve the people, not the political ambitions of individual governors. Knowing what we know, how many governors will commit to this in practice?

Ultimately, Nigeria’s current policing system is in urgent need of reform. A realistic reform pathway lies in restructuring the existing centralised system to allow for hybrid control and a multi-tiered policing arrangement that accommodates both national and subnational policing platforms.

Whatever choice is settled upon, any serious policy on police reform in Nigeria must be accompanied by a clear framework for sustainable funding, an oversight system, and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the creation of state police strengthens, rather than destabilises, local security governance.

State police may indeed be inevitable. Whether they become a solution or a new source of insecurity will depend less on constitutional amendments than on the political will to confront Nigeria’s deeper governance failures.

Tosin Osasona is a criminal justice professional and Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Public Policy Alternatives, Lagos.

L-R: Mr. Omoboyede Olusanya, Vice Chairman II, Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG); Sen. John Owan Enoh, Honourable Minister of State for Industry, Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment; Mr. Wale Edun, Honourable Minister of Finance and Coordinating Minister of the Economy; Mr. Niyi Yusuf, Chairman, NESG; Dr. Muhammad Sani Abdullahi, Deputy Governor for Economic Policy, Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); Ms. Nancy Illoh-Nnaji, Anchor/Executive Producer, Moneyline with Nancy on AIT; and Ifeoma Williams, Senior Special Adviser on Strategic Communications, Office of the Honourable Minister of State for Industry, at the launch of the NESG’s Macroeconomic Outlook Report 2026.

The Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG) on Thursday, 15^th January, 2026 held its 2026 macroeconomic outlook event at the NESG Summit House in Lagos.

The outlook declared that Nigeria has emerged from a prolonged period of acute economic crisis, projecting a stronger growth trajectory as reforms transition from stabilisation to consolidation.

This outlook was unveiled at the launch of the 2026 Macroeconomic Outlook, themed “Consolidating Economic Stabilisation Gains: Pathway to Sustainable Growth in Nigeria.”

While delivering the opening remarks, NESG Chairman, Mr. Niyi Yusuf, noted that while recent structural reforms were necessary, they represent only the first phase of a longer transformation journey. “Nigeria has just emerged from one of the most disruptive adjustment periods in its recent economic history,” he said, adding that “economic transformation is not an event, but a sequenced and perpetual process.”

He stressed that stabilisation alone does not guarantee prosperity, as growth remains modest, uneven, and insufficiently linked to job creation and household incomes.

Whie delivering the keynote address, Minister of Finance and Co-ordinating Minister of the Economy, Mr. Wale Edun, noted that despite the nominal increase in public debt, Nigeria’s debt-to-GDP ratio has declined to 36.1 per cent, one of the lowest in Africa and well below global averages.

Artificial intelligence, geopolitical fragmentation and a surge in cyber-enabled fraud are redefining the global cyber risk landscape at unprecedented speed, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026.

The report, developed in collaboration with Accenture, highlights that cyber-enabled fraud has become a pervasive threat. This shift underscores the growing societal and economic impact of fraud as it spreads across regions and sectors.

The report also showcases how AI is supercharging both offensive and defensive capabilities. Geopolitical fragmentation further compounds these risks, reshaping cybersecurity strategies and widening preparedness gaps across regions.

This year marks the fifth edition of the Global Cybersecurity Outlook series, which has traced a steady evolution from pandemic-driven digitalization to today’s increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape.

The new findings point to a cyber landscape undergoing profound structural shifts, where cyber resilience can no longer be approached as a technical function alone but as a strategic requirement that underpins economic stability, national resilience and public trust.

“As cyber risks become more interconnected and consequential, cyber-enabled fraud has emerged as one of the most disruptive forces in the digital economy, undermining trust, distorting markets and directly affecting people’s lives,” said Jeremy Jurgens, Managing Director, World Economic Forum. “The challenge for leaders is no longer just understanding the threat but acting collectively to stay ahead of it. Building meaningful cyber resilience will require coordinated action across governments, businesses and technology providers to protect trust and stability in an increasingly AI-driven world.”

The gap between highly resilient organisations and those falling behind remains stark, with skills shortages and resource constraints amplifying systemic risk. Meanwhile, global supply chains have become more interconnected and opaque; turning third-party dependencies into systemic vulnerabilities. These dynamics are converging at a moment when inequalities in cyber capabilities are widening, leaving smaller organisations and emerging economies disproportionately exposed.

“The weaponization of AI, persistent geopolitical friction and systemic supply chain risks are upending traditional cyber defences. For C-suite leaders, the imperative is clear; they must pivot from traditional cyber protection to cyber defence powered by advanced and agentic AI to be resilient against AI-driven threat actors,” said Paolo Dal Cin, global lead, Accenture Cybersecurity. “True business resilience is built by fusing cyber strategy, operational continuity and foundational trust—enabling organizations to swiftly adapt to the dynamic threat landscape.”

The report identifies key factors that shape the evolving cyber landscape of 2026. These include:

AI is accelerating cybersecurity risks at unprecedented speed. AI-related vulnerabilities rose faster than any other category in 2025, with 87% of respondents reporting an increase. Data leaks linked to generative AI (34%) and advancing adversarial capabilities (29%) are among the leading concerns for 2026. Meanwhile, 94% of leaders expect AI to be the most consequential force shaping cybersecurity in 2026. Organizations are responding, nearly doubling the share assessing AI security, from 37% to 64%.

Geopolitics is redefining the global cybersecurity threat landscape, with 64% of organizations now factoring geopolitically motivated attacks into their risk strategies and 91% of the largest enterprises adjusting their cybersecurity posture accordingly. 31% of respondents expressed low confidence in their country’s ability to manage major cyber incidents. Confidence levels vary widely, from 84% in the Middle East and North Africa to 13% in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Cyber-enabled fraud has become a pervasive global threat. A striking 73% of respondents were or knew someone directly affected in 2025 and CEOs now rank fraud and phishing ahead of ransomware as their top concerns.

Supply chains remain a major systemic vulnerability. Among large companies, 65% cite third-party and supply chain risks as their greatest cyber resilience barrier, up from 54% last year. Concentration risk is also intensifying, with incidents at major cloud and internet service providers demonstrating how infrastructure-level failures can trigger widespread downstream impacts across interconnected digital ecosystems.

Cyber inequity is widening across regions and sectors. Smaller organizations are twice as likely to report insufficient resilience compared to large firms. Regionally, the shortage of cybersecurity talent is most pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 65% of organizations reporting insufficient skills to achieve their security objectives, while 63% of organizations in sub-Saharan Africa face similar constraints.

“Developments in AI are reshaping multiple domains, including cybersecurity. When deployed responsibly, these technologies can strengthen cyber defences by supporting faster detection and response. But if misused or poorly governed, they can also introduce serious risks, from data leaks to cyberattacks,” said Josephine Teo, Minister for Digital Development and Information and Minister-in-Charge of Cybersecurity & Smart Nation Group, Singapore. “Governments therefore need a forward-looking and collaborative approach to ensure AI enhances cyber resilience while minimising risks that increasingly transcend borders.”

The report calls on leaders across sectors to move beyond isolated efforts and commit to raising the collective baseline by sharing intelligence, aligning standards and investing in the capabilities needed to ensure all organisations can benefit from a more secure and resilient digital environment.

The survey draws on insights from 804 global business leaders in 92 countries, including 105 CEOs, 316 chief information security officers and 123 other C-suite executives, including chief technology officers and chief risk officers.

About the Annual Meeting 2026  

The World Economic Forum’s 56th Annual Meeting, taking place on 19-23 January 2026 in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, will convene leaders from business, government, international organizations, civil society and academia under the theme A Spirit of Dialogue.